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DETERMINATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS UPON DIVORCE IN SOUTH
CAROLINA: AN EXPLORATION AND
RECOMMENDATION
RANDALL M. CHASTAIN*
JAMES B. HENRY**
AND
B. PERRY WOODSIDE***
I. INTRODUCTION
American jurisdictions employ a variety of methods to de-
termine the rights of divorcing parties in real and personal prop-
erty held by them while married.1 Four community property ju-
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This author's purpose is to explore a developing area of South Carolina law through
a description of the approach taken by the South Carolina Supreme Court and an at-
tempt to discern, for the use of the bench and bar, the possible structure and conse-
quences of that approach in light of the national perspective. The article raises, but in-
tentionally does not at this time explore, underlying issues of the state's role in ordering
interpersonal relationships. This author plans to use the interaction of federal and state
domestic relations law to explore these issues in later works.
** Professor of Finance and Accounting, University of South Carolina College of
Business Administration. B.B.A. 1965, Ohio University; M.B.A. 1966, Ohio University;
M.S. 1970, Syracuse University;, Ph.D. 1970, Syracuse University.
*** Associate Professor of Accounting and Finance, Clemson University College of
Industrial Management and Textile Science. B.A. 1968, Furman University; M.B.A. 1970,
University of South Carolina; Ph.D. 1978, University of South Carolina.
1. Although this article focuses on the theories of special equity and equitable distri-
bution for court-effected division of marital property between divorcing spouses, theories
exist which allow courts to prevent the misappropriation of marital property by either
spouse during the marriage. A wife's common-law dower right gives her an inchoate right
to one third of her husband's land, C. KUlxSH, WuLS 1 (1977), during the duration of
her marriage. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-310 (1976). See Shelton v. Shelton, 225 S.C. 502, 83
S.E.2d 176 (1954). A husband's common-law curtesy right, which gave him a life estate in
his wife's lands, C. KAMasn, WiLLs 3 (1977), has been statutorily abolished in South Car-
olina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-10 (1976). One spouse may establish a resulting trust in
property held by the other. See note 22 and accompanying text infra. Finally, some
courts in other jurisdictions have been willing to impose a constructive trust for the ben-
efit of one spouse on property held by the other. See, e.g., Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So.
2d 223 (Fla. 1972). Cf. Murdoch v. Murdoch, 41 D.L.R.3d 367, 377 (1973)(Laskin, J.,
dissenting) (constructive trust should be imposed on business property in favor of spouse
1
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risdictions normally divide the property of the parties equally
upon divorce. 2 The remaining five community property jurisdic-
tions apportion the property of the community between divorc-
ing parties by using methods of equitable distribution, which are
based on consideration of various facts and circumstances.3 In a
substantial majority of common-law property jurisdictions,
courts are authorized to effect an equitable distribution of accu-
mulated property,4 while courts in the remaining jurisdictions
have no general or equitable power to distribute property, and
title alone controls.
5
The prevalence of some form of property distribution in
common-law property states is of relatively recent vintage and
represents a major shift in the traditional legal view of the mar-
riage relation.6 No common-law precedent directly substantiates
who contributed physical labor to operation of business).
2. The four are California, Idaho, Louisiana, and New Mexico. In re Marriage of
Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1976); Michelson v. Michelson, 86
N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1980); IDAHO CODE § 32-712
(Supp. 1980). See Roux v. Jersey Ins. Co., 98 So. 2d 906 (La. 1957).
3. The five are Arizona, Nevada, Puerto Rico, Texas, and Washington. Ivancovich v.
Ivancovich, 24 Ariz. App. 592, 540 P.2d 718 (1975)(fault may not be considered); Shane
v. Shane, 84 Nev. 20, 435 P.2d 753 (1968); Fuqua v. Fuqua, 541 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976); Rogstad v. Rogstad, 74 Wash. 2d 736, 446 P.2d 340 (1968); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1980); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1979); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31,
§ 381 (1967), construed in Puigdollers v. Monroig, 14 P.R.R. 195 (1908); WASH. RaV.
CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961).
4. Those jurisdictions include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
5. Those jurisdictions are Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
6. The common-law notion of "unity of person" contemplated a marriage relation-
ship in which the husband, as head of the household, assumed the responsibility to pro-
vide for the protection and support of his family, see notes 9-17 and accompanying text
infra, and the wife assumed such duties as housekeeping and child-rearing. See, e.g.,
Arrington v. Arrington, 150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Baker v. Baker, - S.C.
-, 279 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1981). It has recently been observed, however, that "[m]arriage is
no longer looked upon as a conjugal relationship in which the husband and wife perform
traditional and separate roles, but rather it is viewed as a partnership between co-
equals." Note, The Distribution of Marital Real Property Upon Divorce in West Vir-
ginia: The Need for Legislative Reform, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 613 (1980). The Commis-
sioner's Prefatory Note to the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT explains that "[t]he
distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly
as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership."
Id., reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 93 (1979). State courts have likewise begun to
2
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the view that both husband and wife have made material contri-
butions to the economic well-being of the marriage unit by vir-
tue of the marital relationship and irrespective of their individ-
ual activity in the economic marketplace. It is unclear whether
this changed approach to property allocation is precisely in
keeping with the views of the citizenry, but the rapid adoption7
of the various forms of equitable distribution-with virtually no
setbacksa-indicates that the pendulum is not likely to swing
back rapidly to the pre-1950s pure-title view.
The near-nationwide acceptance of equitable allocation of
marital property has been replicated in South Carolina, which,
in some ways, has moved faster than the rest of the country.
South Carolina and other common-law jurisdictions traditionally
accepted the common-law theory of "unity of person," under
which the individual legal existence of a woman ceased at mar-
riage and her person, along with her lands and personal prop-
erty, merged and was incorporated with that of her husband.9
Before the ratification of the South Carolina Constitution of
1868, the husband received at marriage a vested interest in all
real and personal property owned by his wife at the time of the
marriage or acquired by her thereafter.10 Upon marriage, the
wile received a dower right in her husband's property11 and was
entitled to a "reasonably adequate and suitable home and sup-
port. '12 The South Carolina Constitution of 1868 permitted a
married woman to retain as separate property any realty and
personalty held at the time of her marriage or acquired by her
embrace the partnership view of the marriage relationship. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 300 So.
2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978).
7. See generally I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY, Preface II, at 6-7 (Foster Supp.
1980)(adapting Foster & Freed, Law and the Family, 1979 N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 31 & Nov. 1,
1979)).
8. An isolated setback occurred in New Jersey when the legislature enacted a statute
effectively restricting a broad theory of equitable distribution that had been judicially
evolved from an essentially standardless statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-23 (Supp.
1980).
9. Clawson v. Hutchinson, 11 S.C. 323, 324 (1878). See Baker v. Baker, - S.C.....
279 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1981).
10. Bouknight v. Epting, 11 S.C. 71 (1878). See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 433 (U. Chi. Ed. 1979).
11. Shelton v. Shelton, 225 S.C. 502, 83 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
12. State v. Bagwell, 125 S.C. 401, 118 S.E. 767 (1923). See generally, 2 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (U. Chi. Ed. 1979).
1981]
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thereafter,13 and this right was reenacted in the present state
constitution. 14 The Married Women's Property Acts, enacted in
the latter part of the nineteenth century, permitted the wife to
earn money and to purchase and dispose of property and pro-
tected her separate property from her husband's creditors.15 In
addition, this legislation sanctioned joint ownership of property
by husband and wife.16 The Married Women's Property Acts did
not diminish the wife's common-law dower right or her right to
maintenance and support.17
When, following an amendment to the state constitution,1 8
the South Carolina General Assembly enacted divorce legislation
in 1949, courts were faced with the task of determining the
property rights of divorcing parties. Legislation, which initially
provided for alimony in satisfaction of the wife's right to main-
tenance and support,19 now provides for alimony for either
spouse.20 Additional legislation specifies the termination of a
wife's dower right upon divorce. 21 Divorcing parties customarly
retained their separate property, determined by reference to le-
gal title. Yet, if one spouse was able to establish with clear, defi-
13. S.C. CONS'T. OF 1868 art. XIV, § 8.
14. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 9.
15. At common law, a married woman's personal property became the property of
her husband as did the use of her real property and any income from it. H. CLARM, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNrrFD STATES § 7.1 (1968). "She could not make
contracts, either with her husband or with others .... was not able to sue or be sued
without joining her husband, . . . [and] could not make a will [or] testify either for or
against her husband in civil or criminal suits." Id. (citations omitted). During the middle
of the nineteenth century, states began enacting legislation designed to avoid these com-
mon-law legal disabilities. Id. at § 7.2. Although all states had adopted some type of
married women's property legislation by 1900, South Carolina was among the first states
to do so, see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-10 to -80 (1976). By recognizing the right of a wife
to sue and be sued in her own capacity, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-10 (1976), South Caro-
lina's legislation was among the most liberal. See generally, L BAXTER, MAmrAL PROP-
ERTY § 2.2 (1973).
16. See Green v. Cannady, 77 S.C. 193, 57 S.E. 832 (1907); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-
10 to -80 (1976).
17. State v. Bagwell, 125 S.C. 401, 118 S.E. 767 (1923).
18. South Carolina's divorce legislation is now codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-10
to -440 (1976 & Supp. 1980). For the text of the original legislation, see 1949 S.C. Acts
216, No. 137. The constitutional provision recognizing divorce is found at S.C. CONST.
art. XVII, § 3.
19. 1949 S.C. Acts 216, No. 137, § 8. See McNaughton v. McNaughton, 258 S.C. 554,
189 S.E.2d 820 (1972).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Supp. 1980).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-190 (1976).
4
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nite, and convincing evidence that his or her funds were either
directly "advanced and invested" to acquire specific property or
were traceable to its acquisition, the court could then find a re-
sulting trust in his or her favor.2
In 1961, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that par-
ties to a divorce could voluntarily confer jurisdiction on a court
to determine their rights in jointly owned property."3 Seven
years later, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted a stat-
ute that gave family courts jurisdiction and authority to divide
personal property in actions for divorce or separate mainte-
nance. In 1974, the supreme court broadened the jurisdiction
of family courts by ruling that divorcing parties could voluntar-
ily confer jurisdiction to divide separate property.25 Two years
later, the General Assembly amended the family court jurisdic-
tion statute to authorize the courts to settle "all legal and equi-
table rights of the parties in and to the real and personal prop-
erty of the marriage... , if prayed for in the pleadings. 216 The
most recent amendment of the jurisdiction statute authorizes
settlement of legal and equitable property rights upon request in
the pleadings by either party.
27
22. E.g., Green v. Green, 237 S.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 583 (1960).
23. Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961). See H. CLARK, supra note
15, § 14.8, at 449 (1968).
24. 1968 S.C. Acts 2718, No. 1195 art. IV, § 34 provided that "[the [Family] Court
shall have all the power and authority and jurisdiction by law vested in the circuit courts
of the State in actions ... [ffor ... division of personal property, whether the same
shall be in connection with an action for divorce or apart therefrom."
25. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974)(citing Piana v. Piana, 239
S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961)).
26. 1976 S.C. Acts. 1859, No. 690 art. I, § 2 amended 1968 S.C. Acts 2718, No. 1195
art. IV, § 34(1) to provide as follows:
The [Family] Court shall have all the power and authority and jurisdiction by
law vested in the circuit courts of the State in actions:
(1) For divorce a vinculo matrimonii and a mensa et thoro and for settle-
ment of all legal and equitable rights of the parties in such actions in and to
the real and personal property of the marriage, if prayed for in the pleadings
thereto. Id.
27. 1979 S.C. Acts 118, No. 71, § 4A amended 1976 S.C. Acts 1859, No. 690 art. III,
§ 2 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (1976)) to provide as follows:
The [family] court shall have all power, authority and jurisdiction by law
vested in the circuit courts of the State in actions for divorce a vinculo mat-
rimonii, separate support and maintenance, legal separation, and in other mar-
ital litigation between the parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable
rights of the parties in such actions in and to the real and personal property of
the marriage and attorneys' fees, if requested by either party in the pleadings.
5
Chastain et al.: Determination of Property Rights upon Divorce in South Carolina:
Published by Scholar Commons, 1981
232 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
The South Carolina decisions dealing with division of mari-
tal property outside the traditional trust framework arguably re-
flect two distinguishable approaches: first, the application of a
relatively well-defined "special equity" doctrine28 and, second,
apparent acceptance and implementation of a less clearly deline-
ated doctrine of "equitable distribution."29 The language of the
decisions does not make it entirely clear whether these distinct
doctrines are both to be applied under the statutory grant of
jurisdiction or whether the court ultimately intends that they be
treated as one doctrine, 0 combining aspects of each manner of
determining equitable interests in marital property. This article
will explore these doctrines as they have developed in South
Carolina and other jurisdictions, their application, and the col-
lateral consequences that may flow from the use of either doc-
trine or some amalgam of the two.
II. DETERMINATION OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF DIVORCING
PARTIES
The South Carolina Supreme Court has variously character-
ized its decisions settling the property rights of divorcing parties
Id. The amended statute is now codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980).
Although the constitutionality of this enactment in the face of a due process chal-
lenge has not been raised in South Carolina, experience in other jurisdictions indicates
that the state's police power is sufficient to justify a grant of jurisdiction for the appor-
tionment of divorcing parties' property. E.g., Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me.
1977); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219,
320 A.2d 496 (1974). But see Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 593, 55
A.2d 521, 527 (1947). The South Carolina Supreme Court recently ruled that the state's
jurisdiction statute does not violate the equal protection clause. Glass v. Glass, No. 21543
(S.C., filed Aug. 6, 1981).
28. Decisions in which this doctrine has been applied include Baker v. Baker, - S.C.
-, _, 279 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1981); Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427
(1980); Poniatowski v. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. 11, 266 S.E.2d 787 (1980); Risinger v. Risin-
ger, 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979); and Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d
566 (1978).
29. E.g., Glass v. Glass, No. 21543 (S.C., filed Aug. 6, 1981); Jeffords v. Hall, - S.C.
_, 277 S.E.2d 703 (1981); Stone v. Stone, 274 S.C. 571, 266 S.E.2d 70 (1980); Young v.
Young, 272 S.C. 433, 248 S.E.2d 588 (1978); Beasley v. Beasley, 264 S.C. 611, 216 S.E.2d
535 (1975); Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974); Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C.
367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961).
30. In Jeffords v. Hall, - S.C. -, 277 S.E.2d 703 (1981), the supreme court affirmed
an equitable distribution of marital property effected by the family court, relying for
authority on its special equity rationale in Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566
(1978).
6
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as awards in satisfaction of a special equity or as approval of an
equitable distribution of marital property.31 Although these two
approaches to apportioning property appear similar, the appear-
ance is deceptive because significant differences accompany their
superficial similarities. Both approaches permit a division of
property between divorcing parties upon a showing of material
contribution by the parties,32 but fundamental conceptual differ-
ences distinguish the two doctrines, at least as they have devel-
oped outside South Carolina.
The special equity doctrine originated in a 1919 Florida de-
cision 3 and subsequently has developed in that state as a
method of ameliorating the harsh results of the common-law
practice of determining property ownership solely by reference
to title. Florida special equity decisions,3 and now those in
South Carolina,3 5 have spoken of one spouse's securing rights in
property acquired by the other. Evidencing a less than total de-
parture from the common-law concept of unity of person, special
equity decisions use language that suggests courts' unwillingness
to recognize activities constituting "ordinary marital du-
ties"-for example, a homemaker's services-as a material con-
tribution sufficient to justify a special equity award.3 6
Equitable distribution, by contrast, is a doctrine that has
developed in a large number of common-law property states3 7 as
a clear departure from the traditional determination of property
ownership solely by reference to title. Rather than speaking of
property in terms of the party who acquired it, courts effecting
equitable distribution employ the concept of marital property. 6
31. Although the terms "special equity, " used in, e.g., Simmons, 275 S.C. at 42, 267
S.E.2d at 428, and "equitable distribution," used in Glass, No. 21543 (S.C., filed Aug. 6,
1981) predominate in South Carolina's marital property decisions, the court has used
other nomenclature including "equitable interest," Simmons, 275 S.C. at 42, 267 S.E.2d
at 428; "equitable share," Poniatowski, 275 S.C. at 12, 266 S.E.2d at 788; and "division of
... equally owned property." Id. at 13, 266 S.E.2d at 788.
32. For a discussion of material contribution, see notes 73-89 and accompanying text
infra.
33. Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87 (1919).
34. E.g., Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932); Arrington v. Arrington,
150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
35. E.g., Simmons, 275 S.C. at 44, 267 S.E.2d at 429; Wilson, 270 S.C. at 222, 241
S.E.2d at 569.
36. See footnote 47 and accompanying text infra.
37. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
38. For a discussion of marital property, see notes 95-105 and accompanying text
1981]
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As a further departure from the common law, courts have dis-
carded the concept of "ordinary marital duties" and generally
admit evidence of the spouses' nonmarket household services for
the purpose of valuing their material contributions.3 9
Because the South Carolina Supreme Court seems to have
applied both the special equity doctrine and the theory of equi-
table distribution and has, on at least one occasion,40 suggested
that the two doctrines may be interchangeable, an analysis of
both doctrines is warranted.
A. The Special Equity Doctrine
The South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the follow-
ing formulation of the special equity doctrine:
Where a wife has made a material contribution to the hus-
band's acquisition of property during coverture, she acquires a
special equity in the property so accumulated which equity en-
titles her, on divorce, to an award in satisfaction thereof; and it
is not a necessary prerequisite that the wife show that she has
contributed by funds or efforts to the acquiring of the specific
property awarded to her, but division may be had even though
infra.
39. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
40. See note 41 infra.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in Ingram v. Ingram, 273 S.C.
113, 254 S.E.2d 680 (1979), that a party's failure to request a settlement of property
rights in the pleadings rendered an award of property erroneous, the court ruled in
Poniatowski v. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. 11, 266 S.E.2d 787 (1980), that an objection to a
property settlement award when there was no request in the pleadings was waived by
failure to object to introduction of evidence of material contribution. Id. at 13, 266
S,E.2d at 788 (citing 15 S.C. DIGEST, Pleading Key No. 406(9) (West 1952)). Decisions
cited in the DIGEST section referred to by the court include Kennedy Lumber Co. v.
Rickborn, 40 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1930), in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained that "[g]enerally, if evidence is admitted without objection to prove a fact
imperfectly pleaded, the defect will be deemed waived" but then went on to hold that
this general "rule has no application where the pleading entirely fails to state a cause of
action, or where the evidence supports a cause of action not alleged," id. at 231; and
Taylor v. Winnsboro Mills, 146 S.C. 28, 143 S.E. 474 (1928), in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court ruled that an item of negligence not alleged in a complaint but placed
before the jury without objection could be considered.
The court in Poniatowski observed that because the property "was purchased with
joint funds and operated by the parties' joint efforts, the award ... could be considered
a further division of jointly owned assets." 275 S.C. at 13, 266 S.E.2d at 788. Without
expressly so stating, the court may have reached its result in a manner consistent with
the theory of resulting trust. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 33
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the wife has not contributed funds or efforts to the acquisition
of specific property awarded to her.
41
Since adopting the doctrine, the supreme court has explained
that special equity is distinct from alimony and that, unlike ali-
mony, an award in satisfaction of a special equity is not barred
by a claimant's adultery, although adultery "is one of a panoply
of considerations for the family court when determining an equi-
table division. "42 Further, the supreme court has ruled that the
special equity interest must be based on "special facts and cir-
cumstances in favor of one party above and beyond normal mar-
ital obligations.
4 3
Although other jurisdictions have adopted variations of
Florida's special equity doctrine,44 the South Carolina Supreme
41. Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 221, 241 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (1978)(quoting 27B
C.J.S. Divorce § 293 (1950)). The court recognized the doctrine without applying it in
McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970) and noted the doctrine again
in Morris v. Morris, 268 S.C. 104, 232 S.E.2d 326 (1977)(declining to award the wife
interest in real estate of husband but perhaps relying on doctrine to justify award of
household furnishings and fixtures).
The family courts have statutory authority to settle all legal and equitable rights of
divorcing parties in real and personal property of the marriage if requested by either
party in the pleadings. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980). See note 27 supra.
42. Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 44, 267 S.E.2d 427, 428 (1980). Although the
court specifically held that a claimant's adultery does not bar the special equity award
but may be taken into account in the determination of the amount of the award, the
court's reasoning refers to the concept of fault in general:
In making a division or distribution of property on granting a divorce, the
court may consider the cause for which the divorce was granted and who was
at fault, and, ordinarily, the circumstance of the fault has persuasive force, but
is not of itself controlling, and does not justify the imposition of a severe pen-
alty in the way of deprivation of property.
Id. at 44, 267 S.E.2d at 428 (citing 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 295(7) (1950)). For an extensive
discussion of Simmons, see Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law,
33 S.C.L. REV. 78 (1981).
43. Baker v. Baker, - S.C. _, -, 279 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1981).
44. Colorado adopted Florida's special equity doctrine (see notes 47-49 and accom-
panying text infra) in Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363 (1947), to support
an award of property to a wife who had performed services, "which contributed to [the
husband's] business advantage," and which the court described as services "in addition
to the usual household duties." Id. at 508, 176 P.2d at 365. Since Shapiro, the Colorado
legislature has statutorily mandated equitable distribution of property upon divorce. The
Colorado statute provides in pertinent part that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of a
marriage ... the court shall... divide the marital property, without regard to marital
misconduct, in such proportion as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors ... " COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(1973 & Supp. 1980).
Illinois courts have used the term special equity in connection with statutorily sanc-
tioned transfers of property to a non-owning sp6use and have interpreted this equity to
9
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Court's exclusive reliance on Florida special equity decisions4 5
strongly suggests a close relationship between applications of the
doctrine by the South Carolina and Florida courts. An examina-
tion of the Florida approach thus offers insight into this doctrine
of marital property allocation.
A housewife's special equity in her husband's property was
first recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in a ruling that a
wife was entitled to a reasonable allowance for maintenance and
support despite the grant of a divorce to her husband on the
ground of her extreme cruelty, which barred an award of ali-
mony. The court justified this result by recognizing her generous
"contribut[ion] in funds and ... her personal exertion and in-
dustry through a long period of time [in] the acquisition and
development of [her husband's] home and other property and
the establishment of his fortune."' "4 The court has since applied
the doctrine to recognize an equitable interest of one spouse in
property owned by the other, and it has become clear that spe-
cial equity arises only from the contribution of funds or services
beyond the performance of "ordinary marital duties. 4 7 Re-
arise only from the contribution of money or services other than those normally per-
formed in the marriage relation. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 25 InI. 2d 342, 185 N.E.2d
201 (1962); Musgrave v. Musgrave, 38 Ill. App. 3d 532, 347 N.E.2d 831 (1976); Overton v.
Overton, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 287 N.E.2d 47 (1972). These decisions applied earlier codifi-
cations of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (1975) (repealed 1977), which provided: "Whenever
a divorce is granted, if it shall appear to the court that either party holds the title to
property equitably belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance thereof to
be made to the party entitled to the same, upon such terms as it shall deem equitable."
Because the statute directed "conveyance" of the subject property at divorce, the Illinois
special equity doctrine differed from special equity in Florida and South Carolina, where
the courts have written that the interest vests at some time during the marriage. See
Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932); Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 267
S.E.2d 427 (1980).
The Illinois legislature recently enacted a complete revision of its divorce law pat-
terned after the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, which provides for equitable dis-
tribution of property and "replaces the common law title doctrine, as modified by the
special equities ... principle . . . ." ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
The Historical and Practice Notes go on to explain that "[ihe concept of special equities
is not retained in the [new] Act." Id. at 456.
45. See Baker v. Baker, - S.C. -, -, 279 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1981)(citing Arrington v.
Arrington, 150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)); Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41,
267 S.E.2d 427 (1980)(citing Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932)).
46. Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 254, 83 So. 87, 88 (1919).
47. E.g., Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1958); Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071,
138 So. 796 (1932); Arrington v. Arrington, 150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1963). Florida courts take a broad view of "ordinary
10
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cently, the Florida Supreme Court offered the following explana-
tion of the special equity doctrine:
The term 'special equity' was judicially created to avoid the
harshness of the statutory rule that absolutely prohibited ali-
mony for an adulterous wife. In its true sense, a 'special equity'
is a vested interest which a spouse acquires because of contri-
bution of funds, property or services made over and above the
performance of normal marital duties.
When a court finds a true 'special equity,' it should indi-
cate that the party has a vested interest in the subject prop-
erty. The award, once made, is permanent and not subject to
modification."
Although the special equity doctrines applied in Florida and
South Carolina are similar, they are not identical. In both juris-
dictions, one spouse's special equity interest in property owned
by the other spouse arises only when he or she has made a mate-
rial contribution to the acquisition of that property.49 Applica-
tion of the doctrine differs, however, in the manner by which
courts in the two states determine whether a special equity
claimant has made a material contribution. Florida refuses to
recognize the performance of "ordinary marital duties" as a ma-
terial contribution to the acquisition of property for purposes of
special equity" and has established broad boundaries for the
marital duties" and have indicated that the following activities fall within that category:
child-rearing responsibilities, Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980); furnishing
all living expenses, furnishing the marital home, and serving as a practical nurse during a
spouse's lengthy recovery from an accident. Arrington, 150 So. 2d at 476-77. The court
stated in Arrington that "[t]hese are commendable acts on the part of a wife but not
compensable by an equitable interest in the husband's estate." Id. at 477.
48. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted).
49. See notes 32 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
50. In the landmark decision of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980),
the Florida Supreme Court adopted the theory of equitable distribution while retaining
the special equity doctrine, quoting the following language from a decision by a Florida
court of appeals:
The evolution of the law of alimony that we have reviewed in length shows
that today the contributions of each party to the accumulation of material as-
sets must be considered in dissolving the marital partnership. Either spouse
may contribute either by working in the market place or by working as a
homemaker. The fact that in one marital venture a spouse is gainfully em-
ployed in the market place and pays a housekeeper to rear the children and
keep house is not distinguishable from the spouse who devotes his or her full
time to the profession of homemaker. The primary factual circumstance is each
19811
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duties it will consider as ordinary.51 As a result, Florida courts
effectively confine the scope of activities on which a special eq-
uity award may be predicated to a contribution of funds for the
acquisition of the subject property and a contribution of services
in the spouse's business.5 2 This narrow application of the doc-
trine apparently was instrumental in bringing about the Florida
Supreme Court's endorsement in 1980 of a form of equitable dis-
tribution accomplished by the award of lump-sum alimony.
53
spouse's contribution to the marital partnership. In the case sub judice, the
wife has been shortchanged. The wife has not been adequately compensated
for the contribution that she made as a fulltime mother and homemaker to the
equal partnership marriage.
Id. at 1203-04 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)).
The Florida Supreme Court then noted with approval that the policy of the district
court of appeals "was not grounded upon principles of community property, but on basic
fairness; a dissolution award should be sufficient to compensate the wife for her contri-
bution to the marriage," id. at 1204, and stated,
We recognize that a trial court need not equalize the financial position of the
parties. However, a trial judge must ensure that neither spouse passes auto-
matically from misfortune to prosperity or from prosperity to misfortune, and,
in viewing the totality of the circumstances, one spouse should not be
"shortchanged."
Id. (citing Brown, 300 So. 2d at 726).
The Florida Supreme Court's reliance in Canakaris on lump sum alimony to achieve
equitable distribution, 382 So. 2d at 1200-01, is necessitated by Florida's lack of a statute
giving courts jurisdiction over property. See note 53 infra. The significance of the Florida
decisions cited is not the device used to achieve equitable distribution but the nature of
the end to be achieved: a fair distribution of marital property. As a Florida district court
of appeals subsequently noted, the Florida Supreme Court in Canakaris and Duncan v.
Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (1980),
marked the dawn of a new era for a Florida wife who has labored beside her
husband in achieving material goals. It is no longer necessary for a wife to
prove, upon dissolution of the marriage, that her efforts directly and specifi-
cally produced a tangible, measurable profit or gain. Canakaris confirms the
fact that marriage may indeed be a partnership in the economic area and that
each partner is entitled to a fair share of the fruits of their combined industry,
whether performed in the office, the factory, the fields or the home.
Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
51. See note 47 supra.
52. See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980); Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla.
1071, 138 So. 796 (1932); Bird v. Bird, 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Roz-
zano v. Rozzano, 307 So. 2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Arrington v. Arrington, 150
So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
53. Florida courts, unlike South Carolina courts, have no express statutory authority
to determine the property rights of divorcing parties. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.10
(1976) (conferring jurisdiction on courts to adjudicate maintenance and financial obliga-
tions) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980)(conferring jurisdiction to settle
the parties' legal and equitable rights in the property of the marriage). Thus, when divid-
ing "the material wealth of the marriage which is being dissolved," Canakaris, 382 So. 2d
12
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In contrast, the South Carolina Supreme Court has indi-
cated its willingness to consider a broader range of activities
when determining whether a special equity claimant has made a
material contribution to property acquired by his or her spouse.
In addition to recognizing those activities accepted by the Flor-
ida courts,5M the South Carolina Supreme Court has called atten-
tion to contributions to a savings account belonging to the other
spouse individually,55 use of separate income for household ex-
penses,56 efforts in rearing children,57 general attendance to
household duties,58 and devotion to the other spouse.5 9 Although
the court has not indicated that any one of these considerations
alone is sufficient to establish a material contribution, the
court's willingness to identify these activities ° before concluding
whether or not a material contribution has been made may serve
to distinguish South Carolina's special equity doctrine from its
Florida counterpart. The court's deliberations may, however,
only indicate that the court has not yet firmly settled on its ap-
proach to property and the marriage relationship since, as will
at 1203 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)), Florida
courts have proceeded under the theories of "lump sum alimony," 382 So. 2d at 1200,
and "permanent periodic alimony," 382 So. 2d at 1201-02. The Florida Supreme Court's
emphasis on "basic fairness" in the division of marital property indicates that its pur-
pose is the same as that of the South Carolina courts when they apply the doctrine of
equitable distribution, notwithstanding the use of alimony theories in Florida.
54. In the determination of material contribution, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has recognized a spouse's contribution of funds for the purchase of a business,
Poniatowski v. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. 11, 266 S.E.2d 787 (1980), and a spouse's contribu-
tion of services in the other spouse's business, 275 S.C. at 13, 266 S.E.2d at 788; Risinger
v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979), Brief of Respondent at 12, 13; Wilson v.
Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 222, 241 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1978).
55. Baker v. Baker, - S.C. _, -, 279 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1981).
56. Simmons, 275 S.C. at 43 n.1, 267 S.E.2d at 428 n.1; Wilson, 270 S.C. at 222, 241
S.E.2d at 569.
57. Simmons, 275 S.C. at 43 n.1, 267 S.E.2d at 428 n.1.
58. Baker, _ S.C. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
59. Id. at -' 279 S.E.2d at 602.
60. Not only has the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized as material contri-
butions a number of activities excluded by the Florida courts, but it has also suggested
that duties which might otherwise be characterized as ordinary can take on "increased
significance" under special circumstances. Baker, - S.C. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 602. Thus,
spousal duties performed at a time when the couple's need is greater may contribute
materially to the marriage, id. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 602, and it may be possible to argue
for the increased significance of any spousal duties that exceed the bounds of those per-
formed in the typical marriage. See also Mann v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1249, 1262 n.6
(1980).
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be seen, many of the foregoing criteria are considered by the
courts of other states when making equitable distribution deter-
minations.0 1 Finally, because the narrowness of the Florida spe-
cial equity doctrine apparently gave impetus to that state's en-
dorsement of equitable distribution, South Carolina's more
flexible approach to special equity may limit the need for equita-
ble distribution in this state.
B. Equitable Distribution
Five years before the state legislature enacted statutory au-
thorization for family courts to settle all legal and equitable
property rights of divorcing parties upon request by either party
in the pleadings,0 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
the parties to a divorce action could voluntarily confer jurisdic-
tion upon the family court to determine their respective prop-
erty rights. 3 In this decision, the supreme court affirmed the
family court's "approximately equal division between the parties
of their total combined holdings."'" In 1980, one year after the
enactment of the statute authorizing family courts to settle all
legal and equitable rights upon request in the pleadings, the
court affirmed an equitable distribution of marital property and
again noted that the family court had jurisdiction to determine
property rights because it had been voluntarily conferred by the
parties. 5 These and other South Carolina decisions, expressly or
tacitly affirming equitable distribution of marital property, pre-
sent two issues that warrant careful examination.
1. Jurisdiction of the Family Courts to Effect Equitable
Distribution.-In 1974, when the supreme court first upheld eq-
uitable distribution, South Carolina's family courts had no stat-
utory authorization to determine the rights of divorcing parties
with respect to real property.66 Consequently, the family court's
authority to effect an equitable distribution of property de-
61. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra.
62. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
63. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974) (citing Piana v. Piana, 239
S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961)).
64. 262 S.C. at 312, 204 S.E.2d at 48.
65. Stone v. Stone, 274 S.C. 571, 266 S.E.2d 70 (1980).
66. Family court jurisdiction was limited to dividing the personal property of the
divorcing parties. 1968 S.C. Acts 2718, No. 1195 art. IV, § 34(4). See notes 24, 27 & 28
and accompanying text supra.
240 [Vol. 33
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pended upon the voluntary request of the parties."7 By 1980,
however, after the enactment of the family court jurisdiction
statute, the supreme court's observation on voluntary conferral
of jurisdiction was no longer necessary.68 Recently, the court
noted in dictum that "the General Assembly adopted the doc-
trine of equitable distribution by statute,"6 and it is now virtu-
ally certain that family courts have jurisdiction to effect an equi-
table distribution upon request by either party in the
pleadings.70 Thus, although the supreme court has recently fa-
vored the special equity doctrine as a vehicle by which to deter-
mine the equitable rights of divorcing parties in marital prop-
erty,71 equitable distribution should nevertheless be available
upon request by either party in the pleadings. 2
2. Guidelines for Effecting Equitable Distribution.-The
South Carolina Supreme Court's equitable distribution decisions
67. Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297.
68. See 274 S.C. at 572-73, 266 S.E.2d at 71.
69. Glass v. Glass, No. 21543 n.1 (S.C., filed Aug. 6, 1981)(citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980)).
70. The dictum in Glass, id., has a sound basis in earlier South Carolina decisions.
The supreme court recognized in a special equity decision that the immediate predeces-
sor of section 14-21-1020 of the South Carolina Code, 1976 S.C. Acts 1859, No. 690, art.
III, § 2 (amended by 1979 S.C. Acts 118, No. 71, § 4A), "empower[ed] the family court to
determine 'all legal and equitable rights' of the parties in a divorce action 'in and to the
real and personal property of the marriage ... ."' Poniatowski, 275 S.C. at 13, 266
S.E.2d at 788. Because equitable distribution unquestionably constitutes a determination
of divorcing parties' equitable rights in marital property, the statute clearly seems to
confer jurisdiction on the family courts to make that determination upon request by
either party in the pleadings. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980). See note 27
and accompanying text supra.
71. For a discussion of "marital property," see notes 90-105 and accompanying text
infra.
72. The South Carolina Supreme Court requires family courts to review voluntary
property settlement agreements for fairness. Drawdy v. Drawdy, - S.C. -, 268 S.E.2d 30
(1980); McKinney v. McKinney, - S.C. _, 261 S.E.2d 526 (1980); Fischl v. Fischl, 272
S.C. 297, 251 S.E.2d 743 (1979). Family courts can make a determination of fairness only
after consideration of all surrounding facts and circumstances including the parties' re-
spective economic circumstances. - S.C. at _, 268 S.E.2d at 30-31; - S.C. at ., 261
S.E.2d at 527. See Domestic Relations, supra note 42, at 89-91. Although the supreme
court has not identified the source of the family courts' duty to review property settle-
ment agreements, that authority would appear to derive from the jurisdictional statute.
See note 27 supra. The family courts' authority to reject an unfair property settlement
agreement and, in effect, require the parties to modify the disposition of property speci-
fied in an unfair agreement is interrelated with the family courts' power to effect an
equitable distribution of marital property when the parties have not reached a property
settlement agreement.
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contain four elements essential in effectuating the distribution
of property. First, a court must determine whether both parties
have made a material contribution to the acquisition of property
and identify the proportionate contributions of each party. Sec-
ond, a court must identify the specific real and personal prop-
erty that may be apportioned between the parties. Third, a
court must consider the value of nonliquid property. Finally, a
court must decide on the manner in which to distribute the
property. These elements are similar to those that must be ex-
amined when a special equity issue is raised; the principal dis-
tinction is the measure of the contribution.
a. Criteria upon which to base the amount distrib-
uted.-The most important criterion considered by courts when
effecting an equitable distribution is the material contribution of
the respective divorcing parties. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has indicated that material contribution to the acquisition
of property may be either direct or indirect.73 Direct contribu-
tion occurs when one spouse furnishes funds used to purchase
property 4 and can form the basis on which to predicate equita-
ble distribution of property, 5 a special equity award,7 6 or a re-
sulting trust.7 7 Indirect contribution, which is less susceptible of
precise quantification than direct contribution, arises from activ-
ities of the spouse that have somehow "contribute[d] to the ma-
terial success of the family. '7 8 Although the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has considered indirect contributions together with
direct contributions when making special equity aw~rds,7  it has
indicated that indirect contributions are sufficient alone to jus-
tify equitable distribution of marital property.80 The court's will-
73. See, e.g., Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310-11, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
74. See Jeffords v. Hall, - S.C. 277 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1981); Moyle, 262 S.C. at
310-11, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
75. See Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310-11, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
76. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
78. Moyle, 262 S.C. at 311, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
79. See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
80. Affirming the family court's equitable distribution of marital property in Moyle,
the supreme court stated:
It is conceded by the wife that she did not furnish directly any part of the
purchase price of any of the real property acquired by the parties either jointly
or separately. The record, however, leaves no doubt that the wife indirectly
contributed to the financial success of, and the acquisition of property by the
husband.
[Vol. 33
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ingness to effect an equitable distribution on the basis of a
spouse's indirect contribution is consistent with results reached
in a substantial and still growing number of common-law prop-
erty jurisdictions.""
Statutes and decisions in other states have established spe-
cific criteria to guide courts in the exercise of their discretion to
distribute marital property. Widely accepted considerations in-
clude the age, health, and physical condition of the parties, 2
their station in life,8 future earning capacities,8" and contribu-
tions to the acquisition of marital property. 5 At least one court
has expressly considered interruption of a spouse's personal ca-
reer or education, 6 and another court has recognized a spouse's
lost employment opportunities as an element the court should
consider when making an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty.8 7 Finally, although the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
expressly excludes consideration of misconduct or fault,88 a
262 S.C. at 310-11, 204 S.E.2d at 47 (emphasis added).
81. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States-An Overview as of 1978, 13
FAm. L.Q. 105, 114 (1979). For a current listing of states in which courts effect equitable
distribution of marital property, see note 4 supra.
82. See, e.g., Wicks v. Wicks, 379 So. 2d 612 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Bosma v. Bosma,
287 N.W.2d 447 (N.D. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503(c)(7)(Smith-Hurd 1980). See
generally UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 307, reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 142 (1979).
83. See, e.g., Wicks v. Wicks, 379 So. 2d 612 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Bosma v. Bosma,
287 N.W.2d 447 (N.D. 1979). See generally UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, supra
note 82, at 142.
84. See, e.g., Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); In re
Marriage of Amato, 80 IlM. App. 3d 395, 399 N.E.2d 1018 (1980); Heilman v. Heilman, 95
Mich. App. 728, 291 N.W.2d 183 (1980); Michael v. Michael, 287 N.W.2d 98 (S.D. 1980).
See generally UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, supra note 82, at 142.
85. See, e.g., Matlock v. Matlock, 205 Neb. 357, 287 N.W.2d 690 (1980); COLo. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(a)(Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503(c)(1)(Smith-Hurd
1980). See generally UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, supra note 82, at 142.
86. Matlock v. Matlock, 205 Neb. 357, 359, 287 N.W.2d 690, 691 (1980).
87. In re Marriage of Browning, 28 Or. App. 563, 559 P.2d 1314 (1977). The South
Carolina Supreme Court, affirming an alimony award, has expressly considered a wife's
forfeiture upon marriage of income that she had been receiving as the widow of a de-
ceased veteran. Miller v. Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 283, 82 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1954).
88. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, supra note 82, at 142. The Act lists the
following criteria for courts to consider when effecting apportionments of marital
property.
the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial
agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs
of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in
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number of jurisdictions, including South Carolina, take into ac-
count the conduct of the parties in bringing about the divorce."'
b. Identification of the property that may be di-
vided.-Section 14-21-1020 of the South Carolina Code autho-
rizes family courts in certain circumstances to determine divorc-
ing parties' rights in the "property of the marriage,"' 0 and the
South Carolina Supreme Court, in effecting equitable distribu-
tions, has used the term "marital property,""1 which is implicitly
distinct from the separate property of divorcing parties.9 2 Al-
though at least two community property jurisdictions permit
upon divorce the distribution of all property, whether marital or
separate, 3 most states distribute only marital property.9 4 The
lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the con-
tribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, deprecia-
tion, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of
a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
Id.
89. E.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 382 So. 2d 569, 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 378 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Cf. Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C.
41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980)(court may take adultery into account when determining
amount of special equity award). In Simmons, the South Carolina Supreme Court ex-
plained that
[i]n making a division or distribution of property on granting a divorce, the
court may consider the cause for which the divorce was granted and who was
at fault, and, ordinarily, the circumstance of fault has persuasive force, but is
not of itself controlling, and does not justify the imposition of a severe penalty
in the way of deprivation of property.
275 S.C. at 44-45, 267 S.E.2d at 429 (quoting 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 295(7)(1950)).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980). See note 7 and accompanying text
supra.
91. E.g., Baker, - S.C. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 602; Poniatowski, 275 S.C. at 12, 266
S.E.2d at 788; Stone, 274 S.C. at 572-73, 266 S.E.2d at 71.
92. The term "separate property" is used in the Married Women's Property Acts,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-20 (1976), to identify property owned by a married woman at
the time of her marriage or acquired thereafter "by gift, grant, inheritance, devise,
purchase, or otherwise." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-30 (1976). The concept of separate prop-
erty is also used in community property states to distinguish property belonging to the
spouses individually from the property of the community. See I. BAXTER, MARrrAL PRO?'-
ERTY § 6.1 (1973). Although certain property might clearly be characterized as separate
property, it may be argued that appreciation in the value of separate property has be-
come marital property subject to division if the fact of the marriage has permitted the
owning spouse to avoid consuming or otherwise disposing of the separate property. See
Mann v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1249 (1980).
93. Musselwhite v. Musselwhite, 555 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Friedlander
v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 893, 494 P.2d 208 (1972) (requiring distribution of both com-
munity property and separate property).
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South Carolina Supreme Court, in keeping with section 14-21-
1020, has impliedly limited equitable distribution to marital
property and has recognized the following types of property as
falling within that designation: business interests," the marital
home and its furnishings, 6 stocks and a savings account,9
automobiles, a summer cottage, and life insurance policies.98 In
addition, by reassigning a trial court's allocation of a mortgage
obligation, " the court implicitly recognized that financial in-
debtedness may also be divided between the parties at
divorce.100
Many common-law property states have a decisional history
of marital property determinations much more extensive than
South Carolina's, and a number of states have enacted statutory
definitions of marital property. 101 Nevertheless, difficult ques-
tions still arise regarding the nature and divisibility of such as-
sets as business goodwill,10 2 retirement and profit-sharing
94. See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
95. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. at 12-13, 266 S.E.2d at 788; Stone, 274 S.C. at 572-73, 266
S.E.2d at 71; Moyle, 262 S.C. at 311, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
96. Baker, - S.C. at _, 279 S.E.2d at 602; Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
97. Baker, - S.C. at _, 279 S.E.2d at 602, 603.
98. Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310, 204 S.E.2d at 47.
99. Baker, - S.C. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 603.
100. Other courts have equitably distributed financial obligations incurred during
marriage. E.g., Creel v. Creel, 378 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Matter of Ayers,
82 Ill. App. 3d 164, 402 N.E.2d 401 (1980); In re Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466
(Iowa 1980). Contra, Waitsman v. Waitsman, 599 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
101. E.g., COLo. RE V. STAT. § 14-10-113(2)(Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
503(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980). These statutes were adapted from the original formulation
of the UNIFORM MARRAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 307, which provided in pertinent part as
follows:
For purposes of this Act, "marital property" means all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage except-
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the mar-
riage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage.
Id., supra note 82, at 144.
102. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 42 Colo. App. 457, 600 P.2d 93 (1979);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 585 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Grosman, Identification
and Valuation of Assets Subject to Equitable Distribution, 56 N.D.L. Rnv. 201, 217
(1980); Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. Rxv. 157, 169
(1978); Comment, 7 Sw. U.L. Rv. 186 (1975).
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plans, 103 worker's compensation and personal injury awards,'
and a college or professional education.
10 5
c. Valuation of property.-The South Carolina Supreme
Court has accepted valuations of real and personal property
made by professional appraisers 06 and valuations of business in-
terests derived from federal income tax returns.07 One commen-
tator has suggested that deriving the value of business assets
from federal tax returns is unsatisfactory because tax returns
rely on book values, which often understate the true value of a
business interest.1 08 Indeed, in the context of determining the
fair value of a corporation following a stockholder's dissent to
merger, the South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that "the
trial court must undertake to compute the fair value by estab-
lishing 'the fair market value of the corporate property as an
established and going business.' "10 9 This is to be accomplished
by considering the business' net asset value, the fair market
value for its stock, and earnings or investment value.110 The
court should be equally receptive to these criteria when valuing
business interests for purposes of equitable distribution.
d. Manner of distribution.-The South Carolina Supreme
Court has recognized that "any reasonable means may be em-
103. See, e.g., Kabaci v. Kabaci, 373 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); In re Mar-
riage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979); Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d
223 (Ky. 1979); Tigner v. Tigner, 90 Mich. App. 787, 282 N.W.2d 481 (1979); McLaughlin
v. McLaughlin, 585 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Witaig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292
N.W.2d 788 (1980); Grosman, supra note 102, at 216-17; Krauskopf, supra note 102, at
171-76.
104. Gan v. Gan, 83 IM. App. 3d 265, 404 N.E.2d 306 (1980); Lucas v. Lucas, 83 Ill.
App. 3d 606, 404 N.E.2d 545 (1980); Heilman v. Heilman, 95 Mich. App. 728, 291
N.W.2d 183 (1980); Fries v. Fries, 288 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1980); Grosman, supra note 102,
at 217-18.
Recently, in McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981), the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that military retirement pay is a personal benefit and may not be
divided between divorcing spouses under a community property statute. For a further
discussion of McCarty, see note 176 infra.
105. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nichols, - Colo. App. ., 606 P.2d 1314 (1979); In re
Marriage of Horstmann, 63 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). See Krauskopf, supra note 102, at
166-68; Recent Developments, 45 ALB. L. REv. 483, 495-99 (1981); 1 EQuTrABLE DisTvmu-
TION REP. 2-4 (Jan. 1981).
106. Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310, 204 S.E.2d at 46.
107. Stone, 274 S.C. at 572 n.1, 266 S.E.2d at 71 n.1.
108. Krauskopf, supra note 102, at 163-66.
109. Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975). See Metromont
Materials Corp. v. Pennell, 270 S.C. 9, 239 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
110. 265 S.C. 274, 217 S.E.2d at 791. See 270 S.C. at 19, 239 S.E.2d at 758.
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ployed by the courts to effectuate division of the spouses' prop-
erty."111 Moreover, the supreme court has adopted the following
statement of the scope of the family courts' authority to divide
marital property:
[I]f the divorce court is authorized or required to make a divi-
sion of property or to recognize one spouse's title or equitable
rights in property held by the other, the court need not actu-
ally divide the property between the parties but may award the
property to one spouse and order that the spouse pay the other
a sum in cash especially where a division and transfer in kind
is impractical or does not bring about a fair and equitable
result.12
Notably, "a court may not unconditionally order the transfer of
property as alimony or in lieu thereof."113
Beyond these general guidelines, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has not expressly outlined the methods available to
the family courts for accomplishing the distributions they deem
appropriate, and the scope of the courts' statutory authority
thus remains subject to interpretation. The narrow view would
limit the power of the family courts to the remedy provisions
expressly set forth in the Family Court Act" 4 on the theory that
these provisions are exclusive rather than illustrative. The
broader view suggests that, once having properly acquired juris-
diction over the subject matter of property distribution, the
family courts have power to effect any remedy within the juris-
diction of the circuit courts.11 5 Under this theory, the family
111. Taylor v. Taylor, 267 S.C. 530, 535, 229 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1976) (citing 27B C.J.S.
Divorce § 292(1)(1959)). See Stone, 274 S.C. at 572, 266 S.E.2d at 71; Matheson v.
McCormac, 186 S.C. 93, 102, 195 S.E. 122, 126 (1938).
112. Moyle, 262 S.C. at 313, 204 S.E.2d at 48 (quoting 24 Am. JUR.2D Divorce and
Separation § 934 (1966).
113. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. at 12, 266 S.E.2d at 788 (citing McCullough v. McCul-
lough, 271 S.C. 475, 248 S.E.2d 308 (1978); Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d
566 (1978); Smith v. Smith, 264 S.C. 624, 216 S.E.2d 541 (1975)).
114. S.C. CODE: ANN. § 14-21-810 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Although this view is contra-
dicted by other specific statutory provisions, see note 115 infra, it gains some support
from the maxim of statutory interpretation, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" or
"the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
521 (5th ed. 1979).
115. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-810(b)(17) (1976 & Supp. 1980)(giving family courts
power "[t]o make any order necessary to carry out and enforce the provisions of this
chapter. . . ."); id. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980)(giving family courts "all power, authority
and jurisdiction by law vested in the circuit courts of the State .... ."). Cf. Gardner v.
1981]
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courts would appear to have authority to order such remedies as
judicial sales of property116 and the contempt sanction.11 7 Before
the enactment of the statute giving family courts jurisdiction to
divide the property of divorcing parties, the supreme court re-
jected a contention by a family court judge that he "had no pro-
ductive remedy to enforce child support payments."118 The court
cited several statutory provisions to support its finding that ade-
quate remedies were available.11 9 Because section 14-21-1020 has
since expanded the family courts' jurisdiction, it seems likely
that the court would subscribe to the broader view of available
remedies. When implementing these remedies, the family courts
must observe the requirements of due process 20 and any pre-
scribed statutory procedures. 21
C. Measuring the Parties' Material Contributions
Material contribution under South Carolina's special equity
doctrine apparently must be predicated on a spouse's direct con-
tribution to the acquisition of marital property although the su-
preme court has considered indirect contribution as additional
evidence when determining the amount of the special equity
award. 22 The court has expressly stated that, when arriving at a
special equity award, family courts should weigh the relative in-
comes and material contributions of the parties.1 2 3 By contrast,
material contribution for the purpose of equitable distribution
apparently requires only evidence of a spouse's indirect contri-
bution, 24 and the supreme court has affirmed equitable distribu-
Gardner, 253 S.C. 296, 300-01, 170 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1969)(family court has authority to
make such orders touching maintenance and alimony as are just); Matheson v. McCor-
mac, 186 S.C. 93, 100, 195 S.E. 122, 126 (1938)("[I]n this state, there is certainly no
limitation on the power of the Courts to settle and decree the rights of litigants, save as
prohibited by the fundamental law.")(citation omitted).
116. Id. §§ 15-39-610 to -900 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Bigham v. Bigham, 264 S.C. 101, 104, 212 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1975).
118. Reddick v. Reddick, 266 S.C. 241, 222 S.E.2d 758 (1976).
119. Id. at 243-44, 222 S.E.2d at 759.
120. See Bank Repossessions v. Mobile America Corp., 268 S.C. 622, 626, 235 S.E.2d
709, 711 (1977).
121. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-55-10 to -100 (1976)(injunctions); §§ 15-65-10 to
-130 (1976)(receivership and other provisional remedies).
122. See notes 154-59 and accompanying text infra.
123. Simmons, 275 S.C. at 45, 267 S.E.2d at 429.
124. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
248 [Vol. 33
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss2/5
PROPERTY RIGHTS UPON DIVORCE
tions effected by the family courts upon consideration of the rel-
ative contributions of the parties.125
Before the parties' relative incomes and contributions can
be weighed, however, they must be,identified and valued. This is
accomplished by determining the value of the spouses' direct
and indirect contributions at the time they were made and the
amount of any income foregone by either spouse because of the
marriage.126 Once the value of these contributions has been de-
termined, their present value must be calculated.
12 7
1. Direct Contribution.-Direct contributions include all
funds and property brought into the marriage by the parties and
property inherited jointly by the parties during the marriage.1 28
Although the amount of funds directly contributed can usually
be ascertained from relevant financial records, the valuation of
nonmonetary assets may be more difficult. As noted earlier, the
South Carolina Supreme Court has accepted expert appraisals of
marital property subject to equitable distribution1 2' and can
therefore be expected to accept similar appraisals of the value of
property contributed by the parties such as automobiles or fur-
niture, even if the parties no longer own the specific property.
The most common and quite often the largest direct contribu-
tion will be the parties' earnings from employment. All income,
including wages, salaries, interest, and dividends3 0 can be ob-
tained from the parties' tax returns, bank statements, employ-
ers' records, and other sources.' When determining direct con-
tributions no allowance is made for consumption of goods or
services by the contributors or by other household members,3 2
125. E.g., Jeffords, - S.C. at -, 277 S.E.2d at 704; Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310-11, 204
S.E.2d at 47.
126. See text accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
127. For a discussion of present value, see notes 153-55 and accompanying text
infra.
128. See Jeffords, - S.C. at -, 277 S.E.2d at 704; Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310-11, 204
S.E.2d at 47.
129. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
130. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1976).
131. In circumstances that suggest the possibility of concealed funds, more extensive
discovery may prove useful.
132. The purpose of the analysis is not to trace the consumption of the contribu-
tions to arrive at a net amount provided to the remainder of the family. Rather, the
intent is to determine the total amount available for consumption, however the family
may decide to consume it. Consumption is based upon decisions made after the contribu-
tions are made available and should be viewed as a decision made by the family as a
1981]
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and all calculations should be made on a before-tax basis. 133
2. Indirect Contribution.-Indirect contribution, as gener-
ally defined, includes services performed for the benefit of the
family for which no income is received, on the assumption that
these services are required by the family and would be pur-
chased outside the home if not provided internally.13 4 Although
it has been observed that both spouses may be the source of val-
uable indirect contributions,135 the leading indirect contribution
issue concerns the valuation of homemakers' services.136 Courts
in at least twenty-two states now consider homemakers' services
when making an equitable distribution of property,3 7 and a
number of states statutorily require the consideration of home-
makers' services.138 Given that indirect contribution should be
measured, three principal methods for doing so are in current
use.
a. The Opportunity Cost Method.-This method computes
household production of goods and services by multiplying a
spouse's last or marginal wage rate by the number of hours de-
voted to home production.139 If the party is presently employed
unit.
133. Direct contributions are valued on a before-tax basis for several reasons. First,
determining the appropriate tax bracket for the spouses separately would require a judg-
ment about whether the income of a particular spouse was earned first or at the margin.
Second, if one party owned a tax shelter that exceeded the income provided by both
spouses on a joint return, any attempt to determine a separate tax liability would require
a consideration of the ownership of certain assets, i.e., of the tax shelter. The intent of
the analysis is to determine contributions made to the marriage by a spouse; the tax
liability of the spouses may be only partially related to the contribution.
134. Cf. Moyle, 262 S.C. at 311, 204 S.E.2d at 47 (housewife's services contributed to
material success of family). Nonmarket services require consumption of family resources
that theoretically would otherwise be available for the acquisition of other goods and
services, yet the family chooses to expend these resources on nonmarket services. It must
be assumed that a family makes rational decisions to allocate its resources for the acqui-
sition of the goods and services that it desires-its limited resources requiring the selec-
tion of some at the cost of eliminating others.
135. Hauserman & Fethke, Valuation of a Homemaker's Services, 22 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE, 248, 249 n.1 (1978).
136. See, e.g., Bender, How Much is a Housewife Worth?, McCALL's, May 1974, at
56; Grosman & Casey, Valuation of a Homemaker's Services, 1 EQurrABLE DISTRmUTION
REP. 9 (Jan. 1981); Hauserman & Fethke, supra note 135.
137. Freed & Foster, supra note 81, at 114.
138. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(a) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
1 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980). See UNIFORM MARR AGE Am DIVORCE AcT § 307, re-
printed in 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 142-43 (1979).
139. For a more extensive discussion of the Opportunity Cost Method, see Kiker,
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on a full or part-time basis, the wage received provides a mea-
sure of the value of his or her services. A spouse who is not cur-
rently employed may have an employment history from which
an appropriate wage rate can be ascertained. For an individual
who has not been employed, calculations must be based on the
type of work the individual might do. Consideration of the indi-
vidual's age and qualifications, as well as the employment oppor-
tunities available140 and the worth of that employment in the
market place, should condition these calculations.
The Opportunity Cost Method for valuing indirect contri-
bution has notable weaknesses. First, it is unreasonable to apply
a single wage rate to a variety of household functions that re-
quire vastly different levels of skill and would command differ-
ent wage rates if purchased in the marketplace. 4 1 Second, estab-
lishing an appropriate wage rate or opportunity cost for an
unemployed spouse may be quite speculative. Finally, applica-
tion of a professional's wage rate or opportunity cost, which
might be extravagant, may distort the theoretical market value
of the services a professional performs within a marriage.
b. Replacement Cost by Function Method.-This method
values household production of goods and services by identifying
the various functions performed, measuring the time allotted to
each task, and multiplying the time spent in each task by its
market cost."2 It overcomes the major deficiencies inherent in
the Opportunity Cost Method by recognizing that nonmarket
work includes tasks with significantly different market costs and
by relying on a time allocation element, which has been the sub-
ject of extensive empirical investigation." 3
The most recent and comprehensive time-use studies for
households, conclude that the major determinants for the
Evaluating Household Services, 16 TRm 34, 34 (Feb. 1980).
140. Hauserman & Fethke, supra note 135, at 255.
141. Dishwashing and assisting a child with schoolwork are typical examples of
household contributions that vary in level of sophistication and cost if purchased outside
the home.
142. Kiker, supra note 139, at 34-35.
143. E.g., DoRSEY, TIME SPNrT IN HoMEMAKING TASKS, HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT
AND KITCHENS, (President's Council on Home Building and Home Ownership 1932);
GIROBU, USE OF TIME FOR HOUSEHOLD AcTvTriEs By EMPLOYED AND NoNEMPLoYED RURAL
HoMEMAKERs (Cornell U. 1972); Walker & Gauger, Time and Its Dollar Value in House-
hold Work, FAM. ECON. REv. 8 (Fall 1973); Walker, Time Used by Husbands for House-
hold Work, FAM. ECON. REV. 8 (June 1970).
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amount of time devoted to nonmarket household work are the
number of children in the household, the age of the youngest
child, and the employment status of the contributor.' An un-
employed wife may devote as many as seventy hours per week to
household tasks while an employed wife may contribute up to
fifty-six hours per week to these jobs. 4 5 A husband's household
contribution ordinarily ranges from ten to twenty hours per
week depending on the number of hours he is employed. 46 A
wife's employment generally has little effect on the amount of
time a husband devotes to household tasks.
47
Time-use data may be employed to determine the value of a
housewife's indirect contributions as illustrated in Table I.
TABLE I
VALUE OF INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION PER YEAR FOR EMPLOYED
HOUSEWIFE WITH THREE CHILDREN, ONE UNDER ELEVEN YEARS
SERVICES HOURS VALUE
RENDERED PER DAY WAGE* PER YEAR
Cooking 1.2 $3.25 $1,423.50
Dishwashing .6 3.10 678.90
Family care .2 6.33 462.09
House care 1.5 4.00 2,190.00
Clothing care 1.6 3.10 1,810.40
Marketing 1.3 5.62 2,666.69
Management 1.5 4.20 2,299.50
TOTAL HOURS 7.9
TOTAL ANNUAL VALUE $11,531.08
*South Carolina Employment Security Commission
Because the data contained in Table I represent sample aver-
ages, the figures may not accurately reflect time allocations in a
144. See, e.g., Sanik, A Twofold Comparison of Time Spent in Household Work in
Two-Parent, Two-Child Households: Urban New York State in 1967-68 and 1977; Ur-
ban-Rural New York-Oregon in 1977 174 (1979)(unpublished thesis in Cornell University
Library)(U. Microfilms Int'l No. 7910832); K. WALKER & E. WOODS, TIE USE: A MEA-
SURE OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION OF FAMILY GOODS AND SERVICES (Center for the Family
of the American Home Economics Association 1976).
145. See Sanik, supra note 144, at 213 app. J.
146. Walker, supra note 143, at 8.
147. Id.
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particular household. Should a spouse's actual hours of house-
hold contribution vary from the sample averages, time-use esti-
mates for various household functions can be made after inter-
views with household members.
Difficulty may also arise in obtaining accurate wage rates. It
is possible that the description of a service for which a wage rate
is available may not conform to the function actually performed
by a spouse, and an average wage rate for several related services
may be appropriate. In addition, although current wage rates are
available, 148 data for services performed in the past may be less
accessible. Estimates must then be made that are consistent
over a period of time and accurately reflect the correct wage
rates for given points in time. Although the Replacement Cost
by Function method may be preferable to the Opportunity Cost
method, there may be situations when use of the former will not
be practicable.
c. Replacement Cost by Single Housekeeper Method.-This
method values household production of goods and services by
multiplying the total number of hours spent in household pro-
duction by the wage rate for domestic workers 149 _-usually the
legal minimum wage. While the valuation is easily calculated, it
ignores the different market wage rates for various household
tasks. Nevertheless, for calculations that cover many years and
for which reasonably accurate wage rate data by function may
not be readily available, use of minimum wage data provides an
accurate but conservative valuation of indirect contribution.
3. Income Differential Foregone.-Foregone income can be
viewed as contribution to the marriage unit if a spouse, as a re-
sult of marriage, has accepted reduced earnings for a job that
was being performed or has found it necessary to accept a differ-
ent position with reduced pay.150 Foregone income frequently re-
sults from geographic wage rate differentials or from lack of suit-
able employment opportunities upon relocation. 51 Income
differential foregone is determined by subtracting an individ-
148. See SOUTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMM., SOUTH CAROLINA WAGE
AND RATES AND FRINGE BENEFITS (1980).
149. See Kiker, supra note 139, at 34.
150. In re Marriage of Browning, 28 Or. App. 563, 559 P.2d 1314 (1977). See Gros-
man & Casey, supra note 136, at 9.
151. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUT-
LOOK HANDBOOK 5 (1980).
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ual's actual earnings, if any, from the amount that would have
been earned had the individual remained in the position held
before marriage.152
Table II presents the income differential foregone for a hy-
pothetical case.
TABLE IE
INCOME DIFFERENTIAL FOREGONE
TOTAL POTENTIAL INCOME PRESENT
YEAR INCOME INCOME FOREGONE VALUE*
1976 $ 9,972 $10,752 $ 780 $1,043.80
1977 10,500 11,371 871 1,099.64
1978 11,048 12,740 1,692 2,015.17
1979 12,129 13,540 1,411 1,585.40
1980 14,210 15,100 890 943.40
TOTAL INCOME FOREGONE $5,644 $6,687.41
*Compounded at a hypothetical rate of 6% using a standard com-
pound value table and carried out four places behind the decimal.
4. Calculation of Present Value.-Contributions, whether
direct, indirect, or in the nature of foregone income, normally
occur at different points throughout the marriage. If contribu-
tions to the marriage were liquid funds that had been invested
when acquired, their present value would be greater than the
original amount. For this reason, contributions to the marriage
must be compounded at a reasonable rate in order to determine
their present value.
153
A reasonable rate may be selected pursuant to one of two
theories. The first holds that the rate should represent the aver-
age return that an investor could earn on relatively low-risk liq-
uid investments. Rates commonly used are based on average
yields on passbook savings accounts or average annual daily
rates on risk-free investment instruments such as three-month
treasury bills.11 The second theory holds that the discount rate
should represent the average annual growth rate in income dur-
152. See Grosman & Casey, supra note 136, at 12; Kiker, Divorce Litigation: Valu-
ing the Spouses' Contributions to the Marriage, 16 TRIAL 48, 48 (Dec. 1980).
153. See Hauserman & Fethke, supra note 135, at 258.
154. See id.
[Vol. 33254
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ing the years of the marriage. 15 The objective in both cases is to
put historical earnings in their present value. Regardless of
which theory is used, accurate valuation of a party's contribu-
tion to a marriage requires the use of present value analysis,
since the mere addition of various contributions without regard
to the timing of cash flows will result in a significant error in
determining the total current value of the contributions.
5. Sample Calculations for a Hypothetical Situation.-The
following hypothetical, which for simplicity uses a six percent
rate, assumes the demise of a five-year marriage during which
each spouse was employed and each made statistically average
indirect contributions to the marriage. The illustration employs
the Replacement Cost by Single Housekeeper method for valu-
ing indirect contribution rather than the Replacement Cost by
Function method. Although in theory every attempt should be
made to determine accurately the market value of each service
performed at the time it was performed, the complexity of the
task may render the Replacement Cost by Single Housekeeper
method more cost-effective.156 The wife's direct contributions
appear in Table III.
155. See id. The same theory that applies to estimating future income growth rates
in wrongful death and injury cases applies to rate determination for establishing the
present value of past earnings. Id. at 256. In Baker, the South Carolina Supreme Court
appeared to apply this theory by rejecting "a strict mathematical approach comparing
the parties' incomes" and considering the disproportionate value of the wife's contribu-
tion at a time when the couple's need was greater. Baker, - S.C. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
156. The data and analysis detailed in this section are ordinarily compiled and
presented by an expert who must be able to demonstrate special knowledge based on
expertise and experience that "bear[s] upon the facts of the case being tried . .. ."
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 468, 242 S.E.2d 671, 678 (1978). Although data
appropriate to determine replacement cost by function might result in a somewhat
higher valuation of indirect contribution, the cost of compiling the data might well offset
its value. See generally Grosman, The Gold of Coronado, 1 EQUITABLE DIsTRMUTION REP.
11 (Apr. 1981).
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256
AMOUNT
$ 9,672
300
10,200
300
10,728
320
11,809
320
13,860
350
YEAR SOURCE
1976 Salary
Other Income
1977 Salary
Other Income
1978 Salary
Other Income
1979 Salary
Other Income
1980 Salary
Other Income
TOTAL EARNINGS
PRESENT
TOTAL VALUE*
$ 9,972 $13,344.53
10,500
11,048
12,129
14,210
$57,859
PRESENT VALUE OF DIRECT
CONTRIBUTION*
13,256.25
13,158.17
13,628.14
15,062.60
$68,449.69
*Compounded at a rate of 6% using a standard compound value table
and carried out four places behind the decimal.
The wife's hypothetical indirect contribution, assuming the
accuracy of the estimates present earlier, appears in Table IV.
TABLE IV
INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED HOUSEWIFE
HOURS MINIMU
YEAR PER WEEK WAGE
1976 38 $2.30
1977 42 2.30
1978 42 2.65
1979 45 2.90
1980 45 3.10
TOTAL
PRESENT VALUE OF
INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION
Nq
ANNUAL WAGE*
$ 4,544.80'
5,023.20
5,787.60
6,786.00
7,254.00
$29,395.60
*Based on a 52-week year
**Compounded at a rate of 6% using a standard compound value table
and carried out four places behind the decimal.
PRESENT
VALUE**
$ 6,081.85
6,341.79
6,893.03
7,624.75
7,689.24
$34,630.66
[Vol. 33SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVEW
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On the further assumption that the wife in this hypothetical
was required to forego income as illustrated in Table II, a sum-
mary of her overall economic contribution to the marriage ap-
pears in Table V.
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF EMPLOYED WIFE'S ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
Indirect Contribution
Present Value of
Indirect Contribution*
Direct Contribution
Present Value of
Direct Contribution*
Total Direct and
Indirect Contribution
Present Value of
Total Contribution*
Income Differential
Foregone (from Table II)
Present Value of Income
Differential Foregone*
TOTAL ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION
$29,395.60
$34,630.66
57,859.00
68,449.69
$87,254.60
$103,080.35
5,644.00
6,687.41
$92,898.60
TOTAL PRESENT VALUE OF
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION* $109,767.76
*Compounded at a rate of 6% using a standard compound value
table and carried out four places behind the decimal.
The husband's hypothetical direct and indirect contribu-
tions are represented in Tables VI and VII.
1981]
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TABLE VI
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION BY EMPLOYED HUSBAND
INCOME
$ 40,000
45,000
50,000
53,000
58,000
$246,000
PRESENT VALUE*
$ 53,528.00
56,812.50
59,550.00
59,550.80
61,480.00
$290,921.30
*Compounded at a rate of 6% using a standard compound value
table and carried out four places behind the decimal.
TABLE VII
INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION BY EMPLOYED HUSBAND
HOURS MINIMUM
YEAR PER WEEK WAGE
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
$2.30
2.30
2.65
2.90
3.10
TOTAL
ANNUAL WAGE
$1,196
1,196
1,378
1,508
$6,890
TOTAL PRESENT VALUE*
PRESENT
VALUE*
$1,600.49
1,509.95
1,641.20
1,694.39
1,708.72
$8,154.75
*Compounded at a rate of 6% using a standard compound value
table and carried out four places behind the decimal.
A summary of the husband's overall economic contribution
appears in Table VIII.
YEAR
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
TOTAL
[Vol. 33
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TABLE VIII
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF HUSBAND
Indirect Contribution
Present Value of
Indirect Contribution*
Direct Contribution
Present Value of
Direct Contribution*
$ 6,890
246,000
$ 8,154.75
290,921.30
TOTAL ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION $252,890
PRESENT VALUE, TOTAL
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION* $299,076.05
*Compounded at the rate of 6% using a standard compound ta-
ble and carried out four places behind the decimal.
The percentage that each party contributed to the marriage
is shown in Table IX.
TABLE IX
PERCENT OF ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
BASED ON PRESENT VALUES
WIFE'S HUSBAND'S
CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION
$109,767.76 $299,076.05
26.85% 73.15%
A court effecting an equitable distribution in this hypothetical
situation would order distribution of the marital property in
proportions equivalent to the economic contributions of each
spouse.
Because the South Carolina Supreme Court has not recog-
nized nonmarket household contributions alone as a sufficient
basis for a special equity award,15 7 the valuation of the parties'
contributions must differ depending upon whether a special eq-
uity award or an equitable distribution is being sought. More-
157. See notes 45-48 & 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
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over, selection of the method of appropriation has specific conse-
quences in the federal tax area.
III. TAX IMPLICATIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF DIVORCING PARTIES
The determination of divorcing parties' legal and equitable
rights in the property of the marriage158 raises questions con-
cerning the parties' tax liability that have not yet been finally
resolved in South Carolina. In community property states, the
equal division, 59 or approximately equal division,160 of commu-
nity property is regarded as a division of co-owned property and
is not a taxable event. When property division between divorc-
ing parties carries no tax consequences, each party takes a pro-
portionate share of the predivorce tax basis in the subject
property.16'
The tax consequences of divisions of marital property in
common-law property states are less clearly defined. In United
States v. Davis, 62 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
property settlement upon divorce in Delaware constituted a
transfer of appreciated property for which the transferor-hus-
band incurred a tax liability on the difference between his basis
in the property and its fair market value at the time of the
transfer. 163 The Court further ruled that the marital rights relin-
quished by the wife were presumed equal to the value of the
property she received and that, consequently, she had no taxable
gain and her basis in the property was its fair market value at
the time of the transfer.1 64 The Court looked to the law of the
158. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980).
159. E.g., Schacht v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 552, 557 (1967). See United States v.
Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1962). One commentator has identified the rationale for this
result as follows: "[N]o exchange has occurred, [and] each party is simply taking his or
her proper portion, just as if co-tenants were partitioning a jointly-held asset." Hopkins,
Tax Aspects Of Divisions Of Co-Owned Property At The Time Of Divorce, 69 ILL. B.J.
488, 489 (1981). Any apportionment other than an equal division such as retention of
specific assets by one party in return for a cash payment to the other party may consti-
tute a taxable event.
160. Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213.
161. Pokusa v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 434, 437 (1978).
162. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
163. Id. at 71-74. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 1001, 1002 (1976); Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2
C.B. 63.
164. 370 U.S. at 72. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, supra note 163.
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state in which the parties were domiciled and concluded that
"the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by
Delaware law [did] not even remotely reach the dignity of co-
ownership.-
165
The Davis decision necessitates examination of the rights
accorded to spouses in their marital property by the law of the
state in which they are domiciled in order to determine whether
a disposition of those rights more closely resembles a division of
165. 370 U.S. at 70. The Supreme Court in Davis interpreted a wife's rights in her
husband's property under Delaware law as follows:
The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or disposi-
tion of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descendible, and
she must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the
marriage, she shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems
"reasonable." What is "reasonable" might be ascertained independently of the
extent of the husband's property by such criteria as the wife's financial condi-
tion, her needs in relation to her accustomed station in life, her age and health,
the number of children and their ages, and the earning capacity of the
husband.
Id. (citations omitted). In its brief, the United States noted that
[t]here are perhaps three ways of characterizing marital settlements for tax
purposes: (1) as a transfer of property in "exchange" for the release of a legal
obligation; (2) as what may be called a "division of property," simply giving to
the wife that share of the husband's estate to which she is equitably entitled;
or (3) as a "gift."
Brief of United States at 20. The United States conceded that nontaxable division of
property is "at least a permissible characterization." Id. at 13. Counsel for Mr. and Mrs.
Davis argued in favor of the division of property characterization by noting that
as a legal system, it [the community property system] is, perhaps, more accu-
rately reflective of actual marital customs and usages than its rival system. It
has been asserted, with considerable justification, that the community idea ex-
ists extra-legally to a substantial degree in the common law states. Broadly
speaking, the community system may be said to constitute a de jure recogni-
tion of a de facto marital partnership.
Brief of Thomas Crawley Davis and Grace Ethel Davis at 11 (quoting AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 7.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952)). Although the Court in Davis expressly stated
that it was not persuaded by the community property analogy, 370 U.S. at 70, the anal-
ogy may be more persuasive today in light of growing endorsement of the partnership
view of marriage. See note 6 supra. A recent publication catalogued "repeated recom-
mendations" for legislation to reverse the Davis rule:
New York State Bar Association, Tax Section, Personal Income Committee,
(June, 1978).
U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. 343, n. 6 (1969).
American Bar Association, Tax Section, Committee on Domestic Relations
Problems, 19 Bulletin of the Section of Taxation 63-66 (1966).
American Law Institute, Federal Tax Statute, February 1954 Draft, Section
X107(b), X257.
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, DIVORCE TAXATION HANDBOOK 73-74 (1980).
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co-owned property or a taxable transfer of appreciated prop-
erty.10 6 The Internal Revenue Service has recognized that prop-
erty is co-owned if "(1) title is taken jointly under State prop-
erty law, (2) the State is a community property law State, or (3)
State property law is found to be similar to community property
law.116 7 The similarity between South Carolina's property law
and community property law will be determinative of the tax
consequences that attach to divisions of marital property that is
not jointly owned. e1 8 Because no court has identified the tax
consequences accompanying apportionment of property between
divorcing parties under South Carolina law, decisions interpret-
ing the laws of other states offer the only guidance. Decisions
concerning the special equity doctrine in Florida and equitable
distribution in other states strongly suggest that the tax conse-
quences to divorcing parties may differ depending on whether
South Carolina courts characterize their determination of prop-
erty rights in individual cases as awards in satisfaction of a spe-
cial equity or as equitable distribution of marital property.169
166. See, e.g., Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Com-
missioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969), Pokusa v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 434
(1978). See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
167. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, 27.
168. Jurisdiction to decide questions of federal tax liability lies with the Tax Court,
see 26 U.S.C. § 6214 (1976), the federal courts, and the United States Supreme Court.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402, 7482 (1976). Cf. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80
(1940)("State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate
what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193
(1938) ("The question as to the construction of [a term] in the federal statute is not
determined by local law .... The question... [of] the meaning of the federal statute
is a federal question."). A ruling by a state's highest court is dispositive on any issue of
state law relevant to the determination of tax liability. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456 (1967). In Davis, the United States Supreme Court indicated that, in order
for a settlement of divorcing parties' property rights to be a nontaxable event, the par-
ties' rights in their property must "reach the dignity of co-ownership." 370 U.S. at 70.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court can definitively delineate the property
rights of divorcing parties, only a federal court or, upon grant of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court can determine whether these rights reach the level of co-owner-
ship required in Dau.
169. "Characterize" is meant in a full rather than a superficial sense. Because labels
attached by courts to payments made in connection with divorces or separations are not
dispositive, the Tax Court can make an independent inquiry into the nature of the ap-
portionment. See notes 179-80 and accompanying text infra. Thus, characterizations
consistently applied by the court over a substantial period of time would provide a
stronger foundation for the determination of tax consequences.
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A. The Special Equity Award
In 1978, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Bosch v.
United States170 that a Florida special equity award constituted
a division of existing property rights and was not a taxable
event. 17  The court explained that
if the [divorce] decree represented a tradeoff of the wife's
claimed marital rights for the [property she received], then
under the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, this would be a
taxable event to the husband. If, on the other hand, the court's
judgment amounted to a decree awarding to the wife an inter-
est in property which existed prior to the divorce, ... [it
would not be a taxable event].
17 2
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that "even though the special equity
only comes into actual identifiable form upon the termination of
the marriage status," it is unquestionably "a 'vested' right" that
differs materially from the inchoate interest at issue in Davis.173
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Bosch was cited the following
year by the Tax Court in Mann v. Commissioner74 for the gen-
eral proposition that "[a] special equity is . . .a vested equita-
ble property right. 17 5 The Tax Court observed that the Florida
divorce court's characterization of its result as a special equity
award was not dispositive but nevertheless found that the recipi-
ent wife had a special equity interest in the property176 and con-
170. 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
171. Id. at 168.
172. Id. at 167.
173. Id. at 167-68. The South Carolina Supreme Court has described an "inchoate
interest" as one that "can not be properly denominated, an estate in lands, nor, indeed, a
vested interest therein . . . ." Brown v. Brown, 94 S.C. 492, 493, 78 S.E. 447, 447
(1913)(quoting 2 H. SCRIBNER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOWER 5 (1867)). Thus, the
South Carolina Supreme Court's description of the special equity as an "already vested
right," Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 44, 267 S.E.2d 427, 428, clearly distinguishes the special
equity from an inchoate interest in South Carolina.
174. 74 T.C. 1249 (1980).
175. Id. at 1259.
176. Id. at 1261-62 (citing Capodanno v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 638 (1978), affd,
602 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1979); Mirsky v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 664 (1971)). Two issues
must be examined when evaluating the effect of a determination of this type under state
law. First, state authority to reach the determination must not be preempted by a fed-
eral law, and, second, a state determination must be grounded upon more than the sim-
ple attachment of a label. In McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981)(holding that
federal law precluded a state from dividing military retired pay pursuant to community
property law), the United States Supreme Court noted that ""[the whole subject of
1981] 263
37
Chastain et al.: Determination of Property Rights upon Divorce in South Carolina:
Published by Scholar Commons, 1981
264 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
cluded that payment of a special equity award was not a taxable
event. 17
Although it now seems clear that an award in satisfaction of
a special equity is not a taxable event in Florida, 78 the tax con-
sequences of the South Carolina special equity doctrine are less
certain. As the Tax Court noted in Mann, labels attached by
courts to payments made in connection with divorces or separa-
tions are not dispositive, 179 and the Tax Court may make an in-
dependent inquiry into the existence of a special equity.18 0 In
Bosch, the Fifth Circuit relied on language used by the Florida
Supreme Court describing the special equity as an "already
vested equitable property [right]." 18' The South Carolina Su-
preme Court quoted the same language when elaborating on
South Carolina's special equity doctrine. 82 This would seem to
indicate that a similar result would be reached by a federal court
construing South Carolina law. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in
Bosch noted that Florida makes a clear distinction between the
special equity award and alimony,' 83 and South Carolina has
emphasized the same distinction.' Nevertheless, given the dis-
tinctions that exist between the Florida and South Carolina ap-
the domestic relations of husband and wife... belongs to the laws of the States and not
to the laws of the United States."'" Id. at 2735 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. 572, 581 (1979)). The court also noted that "'[s]tate and family property law must
do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests before the Supremacy
Clause will demand that state law be overidden."' Id. at 2735 (quoting Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)). In his dissent to McCarty, Justice Rehnquist
called attention to the Court's failure to apply the test for preemption set forth in His-
quierdo, which explains that state law may be preempted only when "Congress [has]
' "positively required [preemption] by direct enactment. . . .". 1Id. at 2745 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)(quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581). Regarding the Tax Court's authority
to make an independent inquiry into the nature of a state's apportionment of property,
see notes 179 & 180 and accompanying text infra.
177. 74 T.C. at 1266.
178. See Kornfeld, Tax Consequences of Equitable Distribution, 1 EqurrABLE Dis-
TRIBUTION REP. 9 (Feb. 1981).
179. 74 T.C. at 1262. Accord, Capodanno v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 638 (1978), aff'd,
602 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1979); Mirsky v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 664 (1971).
180. See 74 T.C. at 1261; Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959).
181. 590 F.2d at 167 (quoting Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932)).
182. See Simmons, 275 S.C. at 44, 267 S.E.2d at 428 (citing Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla.
1071, 138 So. 796 (1932)).
183. 590 F.2d at 167 (citing Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932)).
184. 275 S.C. at 43, 267 S.E.2d at 428 (citing Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So.
796 (1932)).
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plications of the special equity doctrine,1 85 it is impossible to
predict with certainty whether a federal court would rule that
South Carolina's special equity award constitutes a nontaxable
event.1 88
B. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property
The apportionment of marital property between divorcing
parties may take a variety of forms. Each party may receive a
portion of all the assets, or some distribution of individual assets
between the parties may be effected. Furthermore, the property
may be apportioned equally or unequally between the parties.
The tax consequences accompanying the apportionment of prop-
erty that is not jointly owned depend on whether the property
can be characterized as "co-owned" under South Carolina law.
18 7
1. Establishing Co-ownership.-Following Davis, a number
of courts wrestled with the question whether spouses' rights in
marital property reached "the dignity of co-ownership" under
state property laws. 88 The majority of decisions on this issue
have been written by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,189
which, in its earlier decisions, interpreted state property laws in
light of indicia of co-ownership suggested by the United States
Supreme Court in Davis.190 The Tenth Circuit in the earlier
cases, found that, under property law in Colorado and
Oklahoma, marital property was not co-owned and its division
constituted a taxable event.191 Subsequent to these decisions,
however, the supreme courts in both Colorado and Oklahoma
ruled that spouses' rights in marital property under state law
185. See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
186. See Domestic Relations, supra note 42, at 82-85.
187. See note 167 and accompanying text supra.
188. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Davis, see note 165 and
accompanying text supra.
189. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Wiles v. Commissioner,
499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974); Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971);
Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Collins v. Commissioner, 388
F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 215 (1968); Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329
F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964). See also Swaim v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969);
In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517 P.2d
1331 (1974); Collins v. Oklahoma Tax. Comm., 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
190. 370 U.S. at 70. For the indicia of co-ownership suggested in Davis, see note 165
supra.
191. 388 F.2d at 357-58; 329 F.2d at 97, 100.
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reached the level of co-ownership. 192 In later cases, the Tenth
Circuit has concluded that because Davis took recourse to state
law,19 3 it would follow the determinations of the state supreme
courts and has ruled that equitable distributions of property in
Colorado and Oklahoma do not constitute taxable events.1 '
It is not likely that the Tenth Circuit decisions would have
significant persuasive value in an analysis of the tax conse-
quences of equitable distribution in South Carolina. The prop-
erty law of each of the states examined by the Tenth Circuit
expressly authorized equitable distribution of property by stat-
ute.195 Moreover, the highest courts in each state ruled that
spouses' rights in marital property resembled co-ownership.1
By contrast, property division in South Carolina is apparently
authorized by the broad family court jurisdiction statute1
which does not provide the specific guidance given to courts by
the statutes analyzed by the Tenth Circuit.198 Furthermore, the
South Carolina Supreme Court's equitable distribution deci-
sions, unlike its special equity decisions,199 have offered no indi-
cation that spouses have vested rights in marital property.2 00 In
light of the foregoing considerations, it appears that the indicia
of co-ownership suggested in Davis201 offer the only guidance for
a determination of whether spouses' rights in marital property
under South Carolina's application of equitable distribution
192. 184 Colo. at 9-10, 517 P.2d at 1335; 446 P.2d at 295.
193. 523 F.2d at 857; 412 F.2d at 212. Without expressly holding that the parties'
property rights under state law must be examined, the United States Supreme Court in
Davis embarked on an examination of their property rights under the law of Delaware.
See 370 U.S. at 70. Given the deference to state domestic and property law that the
Court has subsequently endorsed, see note 176 supra, it appears that the Tenth Circuit
drew the correct inference.
194. 523 F.2d at 857; 412 F.2d at 212.
195. See 388 F.2d at 354; 329 F.2d at 98.
196. 184 Colo. at 9-10, 517 P.2d at 1335; 446 P.2d at 295.
197. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980). The statute neither makes spe-
cific reference to equitable distribution nor provides guidelines for the manner in which
property rights are to be determined.
198. See 388 F.2d at 354 n.2; 329 F.2d at 98.
199. See, e.g., note 182 and accompanying text supra.
200. E.g., Jeffords v. Hall, - S.C. -, 277 S.E.2d 703 (1981); Stone v. Stone, 274 S.C.
571, 266 S.E.2d 70 (1980); Beasley v. Beasley, 264 S.C. 611, 216 S.E.2d 535 (1975); Moyle
v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974); Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297
(1961).
201. See notes 165 & 190 supra.
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reach the level of co-ownership.20 2
In South Carolina, as in Delaware at the time of Davis, a
wife's rights in her husband's property during marriage are in-
choate.203 Her rights are not descendible,20 ' and she must sur-
vive her husband to share in his intestate estate.205 In South
Carolina, as in Delaware, each spouse upon divorce shares in the
marital property to an extent deemed reasonable by the court." 6
South Carolina courts effecting equitable distributions appar-
ently depart from the law of Delaware by considering the contri-
butions of the parties to the acquisition of marital property
20 7
rather than limiting their examination to such criteria as the
needs of the parties and the duration of the marriage. 208
In summary, although examination by the South Carolina
courts of the parties' respective contributions to the acquisition
of marital property militates in favor of a determination that
spouses' rights in marital property reach the level of co-owner-
ship, analysis of the remaining indicia of co-ownership noted in
Davis suggests the opposite result. While legislative enactment
of a detailed equitable distribution statute or elaboration by the
South Carolina Supreme Court on the rights of spouses in mari-
tal property could prove influential, a final determination of the
federal income tax consequences of equitable distribution in
South Carolina must await determination by a federal court.
Once it can be established that marital property is "co-owned,"
the distinction between equal and unequal apportionment has
perhaps the greatest significance for the determination of the ac-
companying tax consequences.
2. Equal versus Unequal Apportionment of Marital Prop-
erty.-Undei Davis, it seems clear that an equal division of co-
owned assets in a common-law state is not a taxable event.20 9 A
202. See note 165 supra.
203. See Shelton v. Shelton, 225 S.C. 502, 83 S.E.2d 176 (1954); C. KAREsH, WILLS 1
(1977).
204. Cf. C. KARESH, supra note 203, at 1 (South Carolina dower right entitles wife to
one-third interest in husband's real property for her life)(emphasis added).
205. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976).
206. Stone v. Stone, 274 S.C. 571, 266 S.E.2d 70 (1980); Taylor v. Taylor, 267 S.C.
530; 229 S.E.2d 852 (1976).
207. See, e.g., Jeffords, - S.C. at , 277 S.E.2d at 704; Moyle, 262 S.C. at 310-11,
204 S.E.2d at 47.
208. See 370 U.S. at 70.
209. See 370 U.S. at 70; Rev. Rul. 74-347, supra note 167.
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question arises, however, concerning the distribution of property
of approximately equal value between divorcing parties. One
commentator has recently observed that "it now appears virtu-
ally certain that equal, 'non-pro-rata' divisions of co-owned
property at the time of divorce in common law states are tax-
free events. 2 10 The Internal Revenue Service has concluded
that unequal apportionments of co-owned property between di-
vorcing parties in common-law states result in a proportionate
taxable gain to the transferor-spouse on any portion of trans-
ferred appreciated property that exceeds approximately half of
the appreciated property transferred. 211 Because application of
criteria discussed in section II of this article could easily lead to
such a result, a determination that equitable distribution is ef-
fectively equivalent to co-ownership will not eliminate the need
to consider tax consequences.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Consideration of facts other than titled ownership when al-
locating property between divorcing parties is a relatively recent
development in South Carolina. The law has evolved rapidly in
this area, and the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme
Court do not clearly establish whether the court intends the de-
velopment of the special equity doctrine and equitable distribu-
tion as two parallel approaches to the allocation of property be-
tween divorcing parties or whether the court merely regards the
terms as interchangeable. In the face of this uncertainty, the
court has a unique opportunity to evolve a scheme of property
allocation that reflects a carefully considered view of the nature
of the marriage relationship and lays a strong foundation for de-
termining the tax consequences of property apportionment be-
tween divorcing parties in South Carolina.
A large and still growing number of jurisdictions have en-
dorsed a concept of marriage as a partnership between two indi-
viduals who work together to reach the goals of their choice.212 If
210. Hopkins, supra note 159, at 495. The author defines "non-pro-rata divisions"
as divisions that entail the allocation to each party of separate assets. See id. at 489.
211. See Rev. Rul. 74-347, supra note 167. For an extensive discussion of Rev. Rul.
74-347 and its implications for unequal apportionment of co-owned property, see Hop-
kins, supra note 159.
212. See note 6 supra.
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the partners' inability to continue this joint venture necessitates
a divorce, accumulated assets are divided in a manner analogous
to the dissolution of a business partnership, and each party em-
barks on life independently. Despite the appeal of the partner-
ship concept, however, it does not accurately embody the values
of those couples who view their marriage as a provider-home-
maker relationship. When a marriage of this type fails, one of
the parties may not be equipped to divide marital assets and
begin an independent life. For these individuals, an appropriate
solution may be imposition of the traditional obligations of
maintenance and support with a corresponding allocation of ac-
cumulated property to the party who fulfills the support obliga-
tion. Any approach the South Carolina Supreme Court ulti-
mately fashions for allocating property between divorcing
parties will constitute a statement of South Carolina's policy on
the nature of the marriage relationship.
Three options for apportioning the property of a marriage
are consistent with South Carolina law as analyzed in this arti-
cle. By giving full consideration to evidence of nonmarket ser-
vices through equitable distribution, an expansion of the special
equity doctrine, or some merger of the two approaches, the court
could fashion a mode of property allocation fully compatible
with the partnership approach to marriage. On the other hand,
by confining its consideration of evidence of nonmarket services
through a more restricted approach to the special equity doc-
trine, the court could endorse the concept of the provider-home-
maker marriage. Each of these courses, however, fails to provide
for the needs of parties in a considerable number of unsuccessful
marriages.
As a third option, the court could acknowledge that some
marriages operate as partnerships and others are more accu-
rately characterized as provider-homemaker relationships. By
permitting proof regarding this issue and establishing a pre-
sumption in favor of one type of relationship or the other with
corresponding burdens of pleading and proof,213 the court could
facilitate a form for dissolution of marriage that best accommo-
213. Because the parties to a divorce can be expected to have conflicting goals, the
danger of establishing a presumption that would be unduly difficult to overcome must be
guarded against. Notwithstanding this danger, the court might nevertheless wish to rec-
ognize one type of marriage relationship as more consistent with state policy.
1981]
43
Chastain et al.: Determination of Property Rights upon Divorce in South Carolina:
Published by Scholar Commons, 1981
270 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
dates individual needs and values. Upon a finding that a mar-
riage had been operated as a partnership, consideration of evi-
dence of nonmarket services leading to equitable distribution of
the marital property would be appropriate. Alternatively, in the
case of a provider-homemaker marriage, a continuing mainte-
nance and support obligation augmented by application of the
special equity doctrine to compensate for extraordinary contri-
butions would be the better resolution. Finally, for marriage re-
lationships that do not admit of facile categorization in either
the partnership or provider-homemaker mode, both equitable
distribution and the special equity doctrine could be applied.
The court could further assist the bench, bar, and citizenry
by giving careful consideration to the impact that its chosen
course will have on the tax consequences that accompany the
allocation of property between divorcing parties. Although the
tax consequences of neither the special equity award nor equita-
ble distribution of marital property in South Carolina have been
finally determined, equitable distribution is more likely to be de-
termined to be a taxable transfer than is a special equity
award.214 Because the federal courts have jurisdiction to deter-
mine tax liability in light of state definitions of property
rights,215 it would seem logical for this state to afford its citizens
maximum flexibility by accommodating both the partnership
and provider-homemaker concepts of the marriage relationship.
In Commissioner v. Lester,21 6 the United States Supreme Court
reached a conclusion that permits divorcing parties to determine
the tax consequences of alimony and child support payments in
the manner that best meets their needs.2 7 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, by continuing to apply the special equity doc-
trine2 8 and by expressly ruling that divorcing parties' rights in
marital property rise to the level of co-ownership in the context
of equitable distribution,2119 now has the opportunity to lay a
214. Compare notes 203-08 and accompanying text supra with notes 181-84 and ac-
companying text supra.
215. See note 168 supra.
216. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
217. See id. at 301-02.
218. See notes 178-86 and accompanying text supra.
219. On the basis of a similar ruling in In re Questions Submitted by the United
States District Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974), the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled that equitable distribution in Colorado does not constitute a taxable
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strong foundation for permitting divorcing parties in South Car-
olina to structure the tax consequences of property allocations in
the manner that best meets their needs.
event. See notes 193 & 194 and accompanying text supra. Parties wishing to create a
taxable transfer upon divorce would still be free to arrange such a transfer between
themselves by expressly relinquishing property in exchange for marital rights. See 370
U.S. at 72.
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